The Polish 11th Carpathian Infantry Division (abbreviated: 11th Infantry Division) was formed in September 1919, and more precisely, it was renamed the 11th Infantry Division 2nd Polish Rifle Division from Haller's Army. This division took an important part in the course of the Polish-Bolshevik war (1919-1921), taking an active part in the Battle of Warsaw in 1920, and later taking part in the operations on the Nemunas in the same year. In 1937, the 11th Infantry Division was officially renamed as 11th Carpathian Infantry Division. The division also received its distinctive emblem with oak leaves and a Hutsul cross. During the September campaign, the unit commander was a certified colonel Bronisław Prugar-Ketling , and the division itself was part of the "Kraków" Army, and later became part of the "Karpaty" Army. The division began its participation in the September campaign on September 5, 1939, and made the history of this campaign by taking part in the Battle of Jaworów on September 15-16, 1939, where, together with subunits of the 38th Infantry Division, it defeated the SS Germania regiment. The unit also took part in the defense of Lviv. Some of the division's soldiers capitulated on September 21, but the majority (including the commander) broke through to Hungary, where they were interned.
Infantry was the most numerous and one of the most important formations in the Polish armed forces in the interwar period and during the September campaign. During the September campaign of 1939, the basic operational unit of the Polish infantry - as in almost every European army of that time - was a division, which, after mobilization, was to reach approx. 16,500 soldiers. Its basic strike force was three infantry regiments, supported by anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery (27 37 mm cannons in full time) and light and heavy artillery (24 or 12 75 mm cannons in full time, 12 or 24 100 mm cannons, 3 105 mm cannons and 3 howitzers 155 mm). It is worth adding that the Polish infantry division showed many shortcomings compared to the German division. First of all, it had fewer machine guns and, above all, light and heavy artillery. Moreover, in the case of the Wehrmacht, the latter were significantly better equipped with motor vehicles, which improved their mobility and had much better means of communication and communication. For example: the German infantry division had 938 full-time cars, while the Polish - only 76 motor vehicles! This translated into the effectiveness of both formations on the battlefield, as well as their firepower and mobility.